Re: Blackholes and IXs and Completing the Attack.

From: Christopher Morrow (no email)
Date: Sun Feb 03 2008 - 15:55:34 EST

  • Next message: Barry Greene (bgreene): "RE: Blackholes and IXs and Completing the Attack."

    On Feb 3, 2008 2:53 PM, Tomas L. Byrnes <> wrote:

    > 3: Backbone routers can't reasonably filter on a bunch of /32s and also
    > forward traffic at wire speed.

    yes they can. the size of the individual route doesn't matter to the
    devices in question, the NUMBER of routes does... (as does the
    associated change-rate of that number, but that's a story for another
    day)

    >
    > 4: It would be much harder to get all the ingress networks, which
    > include all sorts of small local and regional ISPs, to join such a
    > scheme than it would be to get larger ISPS to do so, assuming item 3
    > above is not true.
    >

    some already do this though... not in quite the manner Ben's aiming to
    do, but there are folks that accept BGP feeds in order to drop traffic
    inside there network(s).

    > 5: When one /32 is under DDOS, the rest of the hosts served by the same
    > links are also effectively DOSed, ergo renumbering them out of the DOSed
    > space, while painful, might be less painful than continuing to deal with
    > the DOS.
    >

    you have not had to deal with renumbering I presume? not a raft of
    end-users (consumers nevermind businesses). Why is the assumption that
    the surrounding space is a /24 relevant exactly? The aggregation
    scheme used inside any particular network isn't necessarily '/24 per
    pop/link/service-area'...

    renumbering for DDoS isn't really a workable solution, save the
    distinct case when you own the IP in question and services it provides
    (and other ancillary bits/bytes related to said ip/device/thingy).

    > 8: Disaggregation can be done now, with the tools currently available,
    > and requires no additional hardware, software, or legal agreements.
    >

    your point here is that perhaps instead of this scheme one would just
    advertise the max-prefix-length (/24 currently) from a 'better' place
    on your network and suck all the 'bad' traffic (all traffic in point
    of fact) for the attacked destination via a transit/peer/place which
    can deal with it properly?

    This isn't a bad solution, and it gives you some control on the
    traffic stream, it does have the penalty to everyone else of 'one more
    route in the RIB/FIB'... which I think was Ben's vote against this
    method. (also not a bad vote...)

    anyway, the idea behind multi-as blackholing has been (and apparently
    contunues to get) rehashed a few times over the last 5-8 years... good
    luck!

    -Chris


  • Next message: Barry Greene (bgreene): "RE: Blackholes and IXs and Completing the Attack."





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