RE: Worst Offenders/Active Attackers blacklists

From: Ben Butler (no email)
Date: Tue Jan 29 2008 - 10:14:34 EST

  • Next message: Joel Jaeggli: "Re: Worst Offenders/Active Attackers blacklists"

    Hi,

    Is not the other danger that any anti Dos measure is likely to fail
    unless unified over a significant % of the Internet / AS numbers to
    block to the BotNet client machines at source within their home AS.

    Once the army has been amassed and escaped their home ASes they can
    launch an attack against any target or bit of infrastructure that is
    proving effective or annoying in the disruption of the cyber criminal's
    commercial activities.

    Or, to ask the question another way, would the low % of infrastructure
    backbone attacks increase if the infrastructure started blocking
    effectively attacks rather than completing them through null routing the
    target. If the commercial $ are being paid to the ISP to prevent DoS
    surely the ISP then becomes an extortion target as well rather than just
    the end customer site.

    In a way its a bit similar to a protection racket in that as long as the
    ISP completes attacks rather than blocks them it is in the attackers
    interests to leave the infrastructure alone to a large degree.

    Anything less than a solution that sorts the BotNet problem at source AS
    will end up being like King Canute against a monster Hawaiian style wave
    of vengeful packets. And consequently the ISPs are faced with little
    alternative than to go along with the status quo than stick their head
    above the parapet and end up on the receiving end.

    Black hole routing easy & effective, source identification / traffic
    scrubbing expensive.

    Thoughts?

    Ben

    -----Original Message-----
    From: [mailto:] On Behalf Of
    Jim Popovitch
    Sent: 29 January 2008 14:44
    To: Patrick W. Gilmore
    Cc: nanog list
    Subject: Re: Worst Offenders/Active Attackers blacklists

    On Jan 29, 2008 12:58 AM, Patrick W. Gilmore <> wrote:
    > A general purpose host or firewall is NOTHING like a mail server.
    > There is no race condition in a mail server, because the server simply

    > waits until the DNS query is returned. No user is watching the mail
    > queue, if mail is delayed by 1/10 of a second, or even many seconds,
    > nothing happens.
    >
    > Now magine every web page you visit is suddenly paused by 100ms, or
    > 1000ms, or multiple seconds? Imagine that times 100s or 1000s of
    > users. Imagine what your call center would look like the day after
    > you implemented it. (Hint: Something like a smoking crater.)
    >
    > There might be ways around this (e.g. zone transfer / bulk load), but
    > it is still not a good idea.
    >
    > Of course I could be wrong. You shouldn't trust me on this, you
    > should try it in production. Let us know how it works out.

    Andrew, IIUC, suggested that the default would be to allow while the
    check was performed.

    -Jim P.


  • Next message: Joel Jaeggli: "Re: Worst Offenders/Active Attackers blacklists"





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