Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names

From: Robert Bonomi (no email)
Date: Mon Apr 02 2007 - 22:53:19 EDT

  • Next message: Gadi Evron: "ICANNs role [was: Re: On-going ...]"

    > From: David Conrad <>
    > Subject: Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
    > Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2007 17:33:08 -0700
    >
    >
    > On Apr 2, 2007, at 4:56 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
    > > The recommendation was for registries to provide a preview of the
    > > next day's zone.
    >
    > I think this might be a bit in conflict with efforts registries have
    > to reduce the turnaround in zone modification to the order of tens of
    > minutes.

    This is getting far afield from 'network operations', but the underlying
    issue is really quite simple: There are *NO*PENALTIES* for registering
    'bogus' domains. The registry operator has -no- (financial) incentive
    to investigate, nor remove, a 'falsified' entry. Once a name is in the
    database, _anything_ affecting it is an 'un-necessary expense' to the registry
    operator.

    Similarly, there is no dis-incentive to a registrar wih regard to _filing_ a
    bogus registration with a registry.

    Address _these_ issues, and the domain names "problem" will effectively
    disappear.

    One _possible_ approach to dealing with the problem:
       1) registry includes in it's contract with registrars a (non-trivial) $$
          penalty for any registration filed that is found to contain invalid
          information.
       2) 'formal complaints' to registrar about invalid information must include
          a 'filing fee' for the complaint. If the complaint is in-accurate, the
          filer loses their filing fee. HOWEVER, if the complaint _is_ valid, the
          _original_ filer gets back _more_ than their fee (paid out of the 'fine',
          see item 1, above, assessed against the registrar) while any additional
          complainants get all their original money returned. Possible variation:
          the size of the fine assessed against the registrar for a 'confirmed'
          complaint depends on the number of complaints recieved within some
          'reasonable' time of the first complaint -- and all complaints within
          that 'window' get the 'bounty' for a valid compliant.
       3) Registrars are charged a _sliding-scale_ of fees, with higher fees based
          on the numbers and/or percentages of 'bogus' registrations submitted
          recently. (This is similar to the way 'unemployment taxes' are assessed
          in the U.S. If there are more claims against your company, you pay
          a higher rate than similar firms with lower claims.)
       4) Registrars with higher rates of 'invalid' submissions are _rate-limited_
          as to how fast they can submit registrations.

    Underlying assumptions:
       A) The 'filing fee' approximates the registry operator cost of performing a
          basic investigation.
       B) The 'fine' assessed against a registrar is signficantly higher than the
          actual 'cost' of the investigation.
       C) A registrar that has higher per-registration costs is at a competitive
          disadvantage to those who canprovide equivalent service at a lower price.
       D) A registrar who has to say "We'll take your application now, but we can't
          tell you for xx hours (or days) if your application for that name was
          successful" is at a competitive disadvantage to one who can tell you
          _now_ 'your application was successful'.

    *THIS* gives the registry operator an incentive to 'clean house' -- finding
    and eliminating 'problem listings' is a REVENUE SOURCE.

    Similarly, registrars have an incentive to ensure that their _own_ house is
    clean. Lack of diligence costs them extra money, -and- places them at a
    disadvantage relative to their competition.

    'White-hat' registrars can do something similar with regard to registrants.
    Registrants fall into three broad categories; (a) those who have never
    filed before, (b) those who _do_ have a history of problem-free filings,
    and (c) those who have a history of filings where there have been some
    problems.

    Those with a 'no problems' history are processed in an expedited manner,
    suject to checks for 'abnormal' behavior -- e.g. a radical increase in
    the number/rate of submissions.

    Those with no histories are subjected to additional cross-checking/verification,
    and, possibly, higher 'new user' charges.

    Those with 'problematic' histories get deferred, surcharged, and/or rate-
    limited processing.

    One can 'tune' the rate schedules for 'new users', and 'problematic' filers,
    to reflect the "risk level" that the registrar is willing to incur, -with-
    the recogition that registrar-level penalties imposed by a registry operator
    will affect _all_ registrations through that registrar, not just 'problematic'
    ones.

    1


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