Re: Consumers of Broadband Providers (ISP) may be open to hijack attacks (fwd)

From: (no name) (no email)
Date: Wed Jul 19 2006 - 14:06:52 EDT

  • Next message: David Conrad: "Global IPv6 (IANA -> RIR) policy question"

    On Wed, 19 Jul 2006 02:02:20 CDT, Gadi Evron said:

    > Some ISP networks do not reset open TCP connections of customers that
    > were either cut-off by the ISP or cut off by self-initiation. While it is
    > responsibility of every person to terminate every open connection before
    > link termination, when the ISP initiates this, it cannot be guaranteed. A
    > customer who happens to resume a recycled dynamic IP can then read the
    > previous persons open sessions.

    Low threat level indeed. The following *ALL* need to happen for it to be a
    problem:

    1) You need to get disconnected unexpectedly.
    2) Your IP address needs to be re-assigned quickly - before the ISP's routing
    hardware has a chance to send too many ICMP Dest Unreachable and cause a
    connection shutdown.
    3) Your IP address needs to be handed to a malicious user.
    4) Said malicious user has to be running an IP stack configured to *NOT*
    send back a TCP RST or ICMP Port Unreachable when a packet comes in.
    5) The connection being hijacked needs to have in-flight data that will be
    retransmitted or a keep-alive packet or other similar hint to the attacker
    that the connection exists.




  • Next message: David Conrad: "Global IPv6 (IANA -> RIR) policy question"





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